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I study points programs, such as frequent flyer and other rewards programs, as a rev-
enue management tool. I develop a two-period contracting model where a capacity-
constrained firm faces consumers who privately learn their valuations over time. The
firm cannot commit to long-term contracts, but it can commit to allocate any unsold
capacity through a points program. This points scheme creates an endogenous and
type-dependent outside option for consumers, which generates novel incentives in
the firm’s pricing problem. It induces the firm to screen less ex interim, and to offer
lower equilibrium prices, reversing the intuition of demand cannibalization.
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1 Introduction
Points programs are schemes where a firm creates a currency (e.g. frequent flyer miles or hotel
guest points), designed to influence consumers’ choices and incentivize particular behavior. Such
points are typically either bundled with the purchase of another good (e.g. a flight or a hotel
stay), or sold separately (e.g. through a credit card issuer or a bank). Consumers accumulate
this currency over time and eventually can redeem it for goods. Points programs are thus a
type of indirect allocation mechanism through which the firm allocates goods to some types of
customers. The economics literature on reward programs has generally focused on their role
as a tool to build customer loyalty, or as a way for the firm to introduce switching costs into
the consumer’s choices. In this paper I focus on a different, complementary function of rewards
programs as a way to implement dynamic pricing, where the firm offers consumers the option
to participate in a points program and to obtain the good through it with some probability.
Consider, for example, frequent flyer programs, one of the most well known types of such points
mechanisms. In practice industry experts often describe such programs as a tool for airlines
to sell “distressed inventory,” i.e. residual unsold capacity.1 In recent decades such programs
have become one of the most significant drivers of profitability in the airline industry, and also
account for a significant share of seats.2 Moreover, there is now a very sizable market for airline
miles: a majority of miles are in fact not earned by customers who fly with an airline, but sold
to banks, who pre-purchase them from the airline and award them to their own customers as
promotional incentives.3 On average consumers collect points over a period of 30 months before
they redeem them for an award seat, which suggests that points programs also introduce a novel
dynamic aspect into the firm’s pricing problem, in addition to the usual revenue management
question of how to set prices over time.4 In the airline market, as well as in other industries
that fit my model, such as hotels and car rentals, the firm determines the rate at which points
are issued, it sets the prices that it charges for redemptions in terms of points, and it chooses
1See for example “Persuasive Perks: The World of Loyalty Programs” (CBC, May 26 2016); “Exploring the
leverage in airline loyalty” (Tnooz, Jan 22 2015); “The Information Company” (Oracle report, 2008).
2See for example “Airlines Make More Money Selling Miles Than Seats” (Bloomberg, March 31 2017). In
2007 financial analysts estimated the value of United’s MileagePlus program to be approximately $7.5 billion,
and concluded that the loyalty program, if it operated as a stand-alone business, could be worth more than
United itself, which at the time had a market value of $5.45 billion. See for example “Getting mileage out
of frequent fliers” (Chicago Tribune, July 24 2007). MileagePlus had annual revenues of $3 billion in 2010,
according to IdeaWorks: “Loyalty by the Billions” (IdeaWorks, September 12 2011). At American Airlines, on
average 8% of seats are now taken up by consumers who redeem miles, rather than buy a ticket.
3Industry expert Ravindra Bhagwanani of Global Flight estimates that, for a typical major U.S. airline,
approximately 30-45% of miles issued are awarded to the airline’s own flyers and 5-10% to partner airlines
customers, 40-55% are sold to credit card issuers, 3-8% to hotel programs, 2-5% to car rental companies, and
2-10% to retail and other partners.
4“The Price of Loyalty” (IATA special report, August 1 2012).
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how much capacity to make available for such redemptions. Points mechanisms can therefore
be a valuable revenue management and dynamic price discrimination tool.
A natural question in this setting is how the firm can use a points program in conjunction with
its usual pricing mechanism, to maximize revenues. Consider the pricing problem of a capacity-
constrained firm, as in the examples of the airline and hotel industry. If the firm anticipates
that demand in some particular period is low, it may optimally decide to set prices such that
it does not sell all of its capacity. The firm could in this case offer a points program and allow
some of its customers who participate in this program to redeem their points for some of the
residual unsold capacity. However, this introduces the possibility of demand cannibalization:
sophisticated consumers should anticipate that they may obtain the good through the points
program, which will affect the price they would be willing to pay for the good outside of this
program. The terms of the points program thus clearly affect the firm’s pricing decisions. I show
that this intuition for demand cannibalization is in fact incomplete: although at any given price
the revenue-generating demand for the good indeed decreases when the firm allows consumers
to redeem their points for the good, the firm’s optimal price is in fact lower when it offers this
additional channel to obtain the good, and moreover in equilibrium the firm sells more units, in
addition to whatever residual capacity is allocated through the points program. The firm can
use this as a form of endogenous pricing commitment and extract larger revenue overall, even
in the absence of competition, i.e. in a setting where loyalty and switching costs cannot play
any role.
I develop a screening model of points programs, to explain why such programs are profitable
and how firms can design them optimally. I consider a model where a seller, the firm (e.g. an
airline), has a fixed capacity of a good to sell to a population of buyers, the consumers. The
seller and the buyers interact over two periods: period 1 is an ex ante contracting stage; period
2 is a standard spot market where the seller offers a mechanism to allocate its capacity among
the buyers. Consumers learn their willingness to pay over time: in period 1 they privately learn
their type, a noisy signal of their valuation for the good, whereas in period 2 they privately learn
their exact valuations; the seller only knows the distribution of buyers’ valuations and types,
as in the standard mechanism design problem. In this setting, I study the problem of dynamic
contracting with limited commitment: suppose that in period 2 the seller has full commitment
regarding the contract it offers at that stage, but it cannot commit to it ex ante, in period 1.
Instead, in period 1 the seller can offer a points program to consumers, whereby it commits to
allocate any unsold goods in period 2 among members of the program. How does the ability to
offer such a scheme affect the optimal mechanism in the later stage, and how should the seller
sell access to this scheme?
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In my model the points scheme provides the seller with one more tool to allocate its capacity
dynamically, in addition to the mechanism that it can offer in period 2. This is a natural way
to introduce limited commitment into a sequential screening model, which is motivated by the
many examples of such points schemes in practice, such as frequent flyer and hotel programs.
This setting falls inbetween two alternative canonical assumptions regarding commitment: in
the sequential screening literature the seller is generally assumed to have full commitment, and
hence the ability to offer a two-period mechanism; in the literature on dynamic mechanism
design without commitment the seller is assumed to have full commitment within each period,
but no commitment at all regarding future periods. I characterize the seller’s revenue from the
optimal points mechanism, and find that it is larger than that in the optimal static mechanism,
but smaller than that in the optimal dynamic mechanism with full commitment. That is, the
points program provides the seller with a valuable type of commitment, which it can use to
partially contract with future buyers ex ante and increase its overall revenue. On the other
hand, this type of program is not as valuable as the dynamic mechanism that the seller would
offer if it could fully commit to all future contracts ex ante.
The seller’s mechanism in period 2 has to be sequentially optimal, since the seller cannot commit
to it ex ante. The points program introduces an endogenous and type-dependent outside option
for consumers at this point: they can obtain the good through the spot contract that the seller
offers at that stage, or through the points program. Redemptions through the points program
generally involve rationing, since any residual capacity is allocated among all members of the
points program. The consumer’s trade-off is whether to obtain the good with certainty at the
seller’s posted price, or with some probability through the points program. I show that this
trade-off separates consumer types monotonically: in equilibrium in period 2 high types buy
at the posted price, while low types choose the points lottery. The price that the seller sets to
induce such an allocation has to leave some rents to the high types, in addition to the usual
information rents that they receive due to private information. Hence by offering a points
program ex ante, the seller seemingly cannibalizes some of its demand in period 2.
Importantly, the optimal price is in fact lower than the optimal price in the standard static
monopolistic screening mechanism, and moreover the marginal buyer type is lower than in the
static mechanism. In other words, if the seller sells points in period 1 it will subsequently offer
a contract whereby it sells more units in the spot market, at a lower price, and in addition it
will give away any remaining unsold capacity. The sequentially optimal contract in period 2
is thus more efficient than the static benchmark. Intuitively, in the optimal points mechanism
the seller sets a lower price because it has an additional incentive to increase the quantity sold
that is not present in the usual monopolistic screening trade-off. When deciding whether to sell
an extra unit on the margin, the seller takes into account the typical effects this will have: the
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additional revenue from the marginal unit, and the necessary decrease in price for infra-marginal
units. But it now also faces an additional consideration: if it sells an extra unit, it induces less
generous rationing in the points lottery, i.e. it decreases the equilibrium probability that a
consumer who takes the lottery will obtain a unit. This implies that the outside option of each
type decreases, and so the price that the seller can charge the marginal buyer type increases.5
While this suggests at first that the adoption of a points program is costly, because it leads to
some demand cannibalization and induces equilibrium prices that are below the optimal static
screening prices, the seller does better with the points mechanism overall. This is because,
by offering a points program, the seller reduces its incentive to restrict the quantity it sells in
the period 2 spot market, i.e. it screens consumers less at the stage where they have private
information about their values. This reduces the typical inefficiency that arises in a monopolistic
market and increases the consumers’ interim surplus in period 2. However, the seller can capture
some of this surplus in period 1, through the price it sets for participation in the points program.
Total surplus in the points mechanism is larger than in the optimal static mechanism, and the
seller can capture this incremental gain in surplus in period 1, as the price for participation
in the points program captures some of the consumer’s expected interim surplus, relative to
its surplus if it does not participate in the points program. Hence the seller benefits from the
ability to offer a points program, as it shifts the incentives to screen consumers more on period
1 rather than period 2.
2 Related literature
I consider a two-period model where consumption happens in the second stage, while the first
stage is only a contracting device. The model is thus most closely related to the literature on
sequential screening, including the seminal paper by Courty and Li (2000). In their setting
the firm has full commitment power when it contracts in the first stage, and the optimal
contract is a refund contract that depends on the buyer’s type in period 2. Akan, Ata and
Dana (2015) generalize this model and extend the intuition to a setting where consumers learn
about their types at different times. In contrast, I study the case where the firm cannot sell
long-term contracts ex ante, and has fixed capacity. Deb and Said (2014) weaken some of the
commitment assumptions of the sequential screening literature. In their model consumers arrive
in two cohorts, and when the firm sells contracts to the first cohort it cannot commit to the
prices that it will offer in the second cohort. I further weaken the firm’s commitment power,
5Notice that if the firm could commit to a period 2 mechanism ex ante, this consideration would be absent.
In the optimal mechanism with commitment the firm fully internalizes the effect of the period 2 allocation.
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since it cannot offer a long-term contract in the first stage.
Hua (2007) studies an auction where the seller has the ability to contract with one uninformed
buyer prior to the auction. The optimal contract in this setting has several similarities to the
optimal mechanism in my setting: it induces less rent-seeking by the auctioneer in the auction
stage, it increases the probability of trade by favoring the contracted buyer, and it may increase
total surplus, similar to the effect of ex ante contracting that I consider.
This paper is also related to the large literature on revenue management with strategic buyers,
including Aviv and Pazgal (2008), Jerath, Netessine and Veeraraghavan (2010) and Board and
Skrzypacz (2016), among others. Hörner and Samuelson (2011) study the problem of a mo-
nopolist who posts prices over time in order to sell her inventory before a deadline, where the
seller lacks commitment. Dilme and Li (2016) also study revenue management in a dynamic
model with no commitment: a seller has some fixed number of units to sell before a deadline,
buyers arrive over time and can strategically time their purchases, and the seller cannot commit
to what prices it will offer in the future. Öry (2016) studies a dynamic pricing model where
a seller can offer targeted sales over time, which induces lower regular prices due to lack of
commitment. Dana and Williams (2018) show that inventory controls (where firms commit to
unit-sales limits) allow oligopolistic firms to implement a form of dynamic price discrimination,
which would otherwise only arise in a monopoly. My results also share some intuitive similarity
with models of monopoly pricing with demand uncertainty, such as in Nocke and Peitz (2007).
A recent literature in management considers the question of how a firm could exploit unsold
inventory to incentivize customer purchases. Kim, Shi and Srinivasan (2001) study the design
of reward programs and their effect on competition in a setting where consumers differ in
their ability to participate in rewards programs and in their price sensitivity. Kim, Shi and
Srinivasan (2004) study the role of rewards programs in capacity management with competing
firms. I consider a setting with a single firm and no aggregate demand uncertainty, and show
that rewards programs can also be a valuable revenue management tool, even absent capacity
management and competitive effects.
This paper also relates to the literature on endogenous switching costs in a horizontally differ-
entiated market, such as in Fudenberg and Tirole (2000), Caminal and Matutes (1990), and
the comprehensive overview in Stole (2007). This literature studies a two-period oligopolistic
model where competing firms sell a product in both periods and the firm benefits either from the
ability to write long term contracts that lock consumers in, or from the ability to learn about a
buyer’s unchanging preferences. In contrast, I focus on a monopolistic setting where there is no
scope for switching costs to play any role, and I study the dynamic price discrimination aspect
of points and loyalty programs.
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More generally, the paper relates to the literature on dynamic mechanism design, including
Baron and Besanko (1984), Pavan, Segal and Toikka (2014), Bergemann and Välimäki (2010),
Battaglini and Lamba (2015), Ata and Dana (2015), Garrett (2016), Garrett (2017), Ely, Garrett
and Hinnosaar (2017), Gershkov, Moldovanu and Strack (2018). In contrast to the above papers,
which feature dynamic information, Said (2012) and Board and Skrzypacz (2016) study models
with a dynamic population of agents with fixed private information, where the designer can
commit to a mechanism. Skreta (2006) considers optimal dynamic mechanisms in a model
where the seller has no commitment, and shows that posted prices maximize revenue in this
setting, while Skreta (2015) analyzes sequential auction design without commitment.
A smaller empirical literature also studies the economics of frequent flyer programs in the
airline industry, including Borenstein (1992), Borenstein and Rose (1994), Lederman (2007)
and Lederman (2008).
3 Model
Setup. A seller (or firm) faces a measure 1 of buyers (or consumers) with unit demand for a
good. The seller and buyers interact over two periods, τ ∈ {1, 2}, where period 1 is an ex ante
contracting stage and period 2 is a spot market for the good. Consumption happens only in
period 2. The seller has capacity k ∈ (0, 1) and marginal cost normalized to 0.
Information. I consider a standard two-period information structure: suppose that in period
1 buyers have some noisy private information about the distribution of their valuations for the
good in period 2, and in period 2 each buyer privately learns her exact valuation (i.e. her
consumption utility) for the good, v, which is distributed according to some CDF with support
normalized to [0, 1]. In particular, in period 1 buyer i has type ti = t1 with probability µ, or
ti = t2 with probability 1 − µ. Each type ti in period 1 corresponds to a distribution over the
buyers’ valuations’ realized in period 2: type t1 has v drawn from some distribution F1, while
type t2 has v drawn from some distribution F2. This environment has two main features: first,
buyers privately learn their valuations over time; and second, they have some noisy information
in period 1, with types corresponding to different distributions of valuations in period 2.6 The
information structure is common knowledge among the agents.
6One could also model period 1 heterogeneity as a continuum of types ti ∈ [0, 1] which correspond to different
period 2 distributions Fi over v, with a stochastic order over {Fi}. However, given the subsequent assumption
I will make about the kinds of contracts the seller can offer in period 1, this additional machinery plays no role
in this setting. Hence for simplicity I focus on the case where period 1 types are binary.
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Contracts. I consider a contracting environment where the seller can sell the good in a spot
market at τ = 2, and in addition at τ = 1 it can offer a points program, whereby it commits
to allocate any unsold capacity in period 2 to buyers who participate in the points program
in period 1. This program is a particular ex ante contract with limited dynamic commitment,
and is the main focus of this paper. At τ = 1 the seller sets a fee q for membership in the
points program, and at τ = 2 it offers a contract in the spot market, depending on the history
of agents’ actions in period 1.
Buyer i’s strategy consists of
ai(ti, q) ∈ {participate, not} at τ = 1,
bi(v, p, ai) ∈ {buy, not} at τ = 2.
That is, buyer i chooses whether to participate or not in the points program, as a function of its
type ti and the fee q, and whether to purchase a unit of the good in the spot market, as a function
of its realized valuation v, the price it faces, and the history of its period 1 participation.7
Because the seller faces a continuum of infinitesimal buyers, with no aggregate uncertainty, it
is without loss of generality to restrict attention to posted price mechanisms in the spot market
at τ = 2. Hence the seller’s strategy consists of:
q at τ = 1,
p(a) at τ = 2.
That is, the seller designs a points mechanism, with a membership fee q chosen in period 1, and
spot prices p(a) chosen in period 2, depending on the history of play a = ∪iai. This contracting
environment features limited commitment for the seller: at τ = 2 it has full commitment within
that period, but at τ = 1 it cannot commit to what prices and allocations it will offer at τ = 2.
That is, there is no direct interdependence between q and p(·).
This form of limited commitment is motivated by examples of such points programs offered
in practice. Airlines use rewards or loyalty programs which allow consumers to redeem their
7In practice consumers may make purchase decisions dynamically: in an airline market at any point in time
the consumer can buy a seat at some price, or try to obtain it through the airline’s points program, where it
is typically only available with some probability. Hence if the consumer cannot find a seat through the points
program, she may still purchase a ticket in the spot market in the future, or wait for a seat to become available
(with some probability) in the points program. I model this in a stylized way—a static game where consumers
simultaneously decide whether to purchase a unit or take the lottery. While this does not explicitly capture
the timing dimension of purchases, it is a realistic and simple way to model the consumer’s main trade-off.
Moreover, the static model fits some examples very well—for instance business class upgrades allocated to elite
status flyers just before a flight.
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frequent flyer miles for seats; such seats are released to members of the programs according to
an inventory management algorithm, which determines how many seats to release over time,
with unsold seats typically released close to the date of the flight. As another example, airlines
also use points programs to allocate unsold business class seats among loyalty program members
with elite status. Analogous reward programs and inventory management algorithms are also
used by hotels, and can be used in other industries where capacity-constrained firms sell to
consumers with dynamic valuations.
Equilibrium. I focus on the equilibrium of this game where type t1 participates in period
1, whereas type t2 does not—this is the most interesting case, since period 1 heterogeneity
interacts with the period 2 incentives of the seller. My results implicitly also cover the case
where neither type participates in period 1 (which collapses to the canonical static screening
model), and the case where both types participate in period 1 (which mimics the case with no
heterogeneity in period 1, i.e. as if µ = 1). This model can also be interpreted as a setting
with dynamic privately known arrival times and valuations, where buyers arrive at τ = 1 with
probability µ and subsequently have valuations v drawn from F1, or buyers arrive at τ = 2 with
probability 1 − µ and have valuations v drawn from F2.8 The results in this paper apply to
both interpretations.
Timeline. To summarize, at τ = 1: (i) buyers privately learn ti ∈ {t1, t2}; (ii) the seller offers
a points program with fee q; (iii) buyers decide whether to participate in the points program
or not; at τ = 2: (i) each buyer privately realizes her value v ∼ Fi; (ii) the seller observes
the history of period 1 actions, updates its beliefs about the distributions of values, and offers
posted prices for the good; (iii) buyers simultaneously decide whether to purchase a unit at the
posted price or not; any unsold capacity is allocated among consumers who participated in the
points program at τ = 1 and have not bought a unit at τ = 2.
In this model period 1 represents the period when the seller sets the terms of its points scheme
(e.g. an airline sets the earning and redemption rates for its frequent flyer program) and the
price to participate (e.g. the implicit price of frequent flyer miles that is bundled into the price of
past purchased tickets), while period 2 represents the market for the good itself (e.g. the market
for some airline route on a specific date), where consumers have more precise private information
about their willingness to pay. One could also interpret this setting as a reduced form model of
8In this interpretation, the seller can interact with type t1 at τ = 1, but not with type t2, for example
because the seller has previously interacted with type t1 and not with type t2, as in a repeated game where
consumers can purchase from the seller over different periods, and past purchases are bundled with participation
in the points program.
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a repeated contracting game, where the seller serves overlapping cohorts of buyers over time,
and the purchase in each period bundles together a unit of the good and the participation in a
points program that will allocate future unsold capacity, as is the case in the hotel and airline
examples.
4 Analysis
4.1 The optimal points mechanism
Consider the equilibrium of the game where all type t1 buyers participate in the points program
at τ = 1, while type t2 do not. The sequentially optimal contract offered at τ = 2 is a posted
price mechanism, p(a), conditional on the history of play. At τ = 2 there are two cases,
depending on whether buyers participate in the points program at τ = 1 or not, and in each
case the seller updates its beliefs about the distribution of valuations and sets prices accordingly.
To simplify the notation I denote the prices by p1 ≡ p(ai = participate) and p2 ≡ p(ai = not),
since in equilibrium type t1 participates, while type t2 does not; note that prices themselves
depend on only on period 1 actions, not types.
The value of participating in the points program is determined endogenously, depending on the
sequentially optimal prices that the seller sets at τ = 2 in equilibrium. Given any prices (p1, p2)
and the resulting allocation at τ = 2, a type t1 consumer has an endogenous outside option, to
obtain the good with some probability through the points program. This probability depends
on the seller’s capacity and on the measure of buyers who buy a unit of the good. Notice that for
any posted price pi, there exists some marginal cutoff valuation, denoted v̄i, at which a buyer is
indifferent between buying at the posted price and taking their outside option. A buyer of type
ti with value vi > v̄i strictly prefers to buy a unit at the posted price, whereas one with value
vi < v̄i strictly prefers the outside option. The following lemma expresses type t1’s probability
of receiving a unit from the points program as a function of these marginal cutoff valuations,




k − µ[1− F1(v̄1)]− (1− µ)[1− F2(v̄2)]
µF1(v̄1)
denote a type t1 buyer’s endogenous probability of receiving a unit from the points program, when
the marginal buyer types are v̄1, v̄2.
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Then the seller’s problem at τ = 2 can be written as:
max
v̄1,v̄2
v̄1[1−H(v̄1, v̄2)][1− F1(v̄1)]µ + v̄2[1− F2(v̄2)](1− µ)
H(v̄1, v̄2) is determined endogenously in equilibrium, depending on the buyers’ decisions whether
to buy a unit at the posted price or not. In equilibrium it must be equal to the seller’s residual
capacity, divided by the measure of type t1 buyers who take the outside option, conditional
on the t1 buyers participating in the points program at τ = 1. This endogenous outside
option changes the buyer’s purchase decision and the seller’s pricing problem, relative to the
usual monopolistic pricing problem with exogenous outside options, and will be reflected in the
regularity condition imposed on the distribution of values, discussed further below.
The lemma also expresses the seller’s objective in terms of allocations rather than prices. The
seller’s problem at τ = 2 is to choose prices p1, p2 to maximize revenue, subject to the constraints
imposed by the buyers’ outside options. In particular, type t2’s outside option is 0, so a buyer
of type t2 buys a unit at price p2 if and only if v2 ≥ p2. Hence the marginal cutoff valuation for
a type t2 buyer is
p2 = v̄2.
In contrast, a type t1 buyer has the option to obtain a unit from the points program, with
probability H(v̄1, v̄2) defined above. In equilibrium this endogenous probability must be con-
sistent with the seller’s posted prices, so we can also relate v̄1 and p1. In particular, a type t1
buyer with value v1 will buy a unit at price p1 if and only if v1 − p1 ≥ v1 ·H(v̄1, v̄2). Hence the
marginal cutoff valuation for a type t1 buyer is given by
p1 = v̄1[1−H(v̄1, v̄2)].
Figure 1 provides a graphical representation of how the t1 cutoff valuation is determined. The
marginal buyer valuation v̄1 is a fixed point in this figure, for a given v̄2: at any posted price p1,
there is a unique cutoff v̄1 such that type v̄1 is indifferent between buying or taking the outside
option, whose value itself depends on v̄1, reflected in the slope of the dashed line. The figure
shows two candidate prices, p1 (in black) and p′1 (in red), and the corresponding marginal types,
outside options, and payoffs that they induce. The seller’s problem is then to maximize over
the space of allocations consistent with the outside options.
To guarantee the existence and uniqueness of an optimal mechanism, I impose the following
modified regularity conditions on the distributions of values, F1 and F2.












Figure 1: The cutoff type v̄1 as a fixed point.











These regularity conditions are analogous to the usual regularity assumption on virtual values,
for which the monotone hazard rate property is a sufficient condition. In this case, since there
are two different distributions, I require a joint regularity condition on both to guarantee the
existence and uniqueness of an optimal mechanism. Type t1’s virtual surplus expression captures
the usual virtual surplus term, and also an additional term that reflects t1’s outside option of
receiving a unit from the points program. Type t2’s virtual surplus also captures the usual
virtual surplus term, and an additional second-order term that reflects t2’s effect on t1’s outside
option (since t2’s purchase decision affects the residual capacity that will be allocated among
t1 types. This regularity condition is satisfied for many distributions of interest, such as power
distributions or piecewise uniform distributions. The special case where F1 = F2 has a natural
interpretation in this model: all consumers’ values are drawn from the same distribution, F ,
but type t1 consumers can be contracted with at τ = 1, whereas type t2 cannot, for example
because type t1 have purchased from the seller in the past, while type t2 have not, or because
type t2 arrive in period 2. With F1 = F2 = F the regularity condition simplifies to
v̂ = [1− F (v̂)]F (v̂)
F ′(v̂) .
I also impose a condition on the capacity k, which ensures that the seller’s problem is non-trivial
(i.e. does not collapse to the usual static screening problem).
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Assumption 2. Assume k ≥ µ[1− F1(v̂1)] + (1− µ)[1− F2(v̂2)].
This assumption guarantees that the residual capacity is weakly positive (correspondingly,
H(v̂1, v̂2) ≥ 0), which is the case where the points program plays an interesting role in the
seller’s problem. If this assumption were violated because k is too low, then the capacity
constraint would be binding at τ = 2, so the buyers’ outside option would be 0 and hence
the seller’s problem would be identical to the usual static monopoly pricing problem, with no
points program. The case where the seller has some residual capacity is more interesting from
an economic perspective, and also empirically more relevant to loyalty and rewards programs
in practice, as they typically involve unsold capacity.
I can now characterize the optimal points mechanism at τ = 2.
Proposition 1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the optimal mechanism at τ = 2 allocates a unit












Type-t1 buyers with v1 < v̂1 participate in the points lottery, while type t2-buyers with v2 < v̂2
are excluded from the mechanism. The optimal prices which implement this allocation are
p1 = v̂1[1−H(v̂1, v̂2)],
p2 = v̂2.
The main intuition behind this result is the following: the optimal prices p1, p2 are determined
by the standard monopoly screening trade-off, plus the additional consideration that when the
seller lowers p1 on the margin, it induces more t1 types to buy the good, which lowers t1’s
endogenous equilibrium probability of obtaining a unit through the points lottery. Hence the
value of the outside option of a type t1 who buys at the posted price decreases, and the seller
can charge a marginally higher price. Thus the seller now has an additional incentive to lower
its prices and to increase the number of units sold, as that allows it to leave smaller rents to t1
types that buy at the posted price, given the cutoff strategy that buyers play in equilibrium.
This effect applies to both t1 and t2 buyers, and is reflected in the expressions for t1 and t2’s
virtual surpluses. Assumption 1 guarantees that there exist unique threshold valuations v̂1, v̂2,
and hence a unique solution to the seller’s problem.
This result shows that the ability of the seller to offer a points program leads to lower prices
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in period 2 and a larger total surplus. The endogenous outside option of the points mechanism
reduces the seller’s incentive to screen consumers at the interim stage. Proposition 1 suggests
several hypotheses that one could test empirically, for example in the airline industry:
(i) consumers who redeem points for award seats have lower values than those who buy tickets
at the posted price;
(ii) consumers who buy tickets but have the option to redeem points for award seats face
lower equilibrium prices than if they did not have the option to redeem awards (e.g. when
aggregate demand is high and the seller’s capacity constraint binds);
(iii) when the seller’s capacity constraint is not binding, equilibrium prices are decreasing in
the seller’s capacity (whereas absent a points program, they would be constant).
Given the sequentially optimal mechanism at τ = 2 found in Proposition 1, I can now also
characterize the optimal price that the seller should charge at τ = 1 for participation in the
points program, and the seller’s overall profit from the 2 periods. Let cs1(v̂1) denote type
t1’s expected interim surplus at τ = 2 if it participates in the points program at τ = 1; i.e.
it faces a mechanism with a marginal valuation cutoff v̂1 and a corresponding posted price
p1 = v̂1[1−H(v̂1)]. Analogously, let c̄s1(v̂2) denote type t1’s expected interim surplus at τ = 2
if it does not participate in the points program at τ = 1, i.e. it faces a mechanism with a












Proposition 2. The seller’s optimal price for participation in the points program at τ = 1 is
q = cs1(v̂1)− c̄s1(v̂2)
and the expected total revenue from the optimal mechanism is
π = [1− F1(v̂1)]
2
F ′1(v̂1)
[µ+ (1− µ)(1− F2(v̂2))− k]+









The intuition for this result is that at τ = 1 the seller must charge a fee q that induces type t1 to
participate in the points program, rather than opt out of it and mimic type t2. The optimal fee
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is then equal to the difference between t1’s expected interim surplus from the two continuation
games, and it leaves t1 exactly indifferent between participating in the points mechanism and
not. Hence type t1’s expected overall surplus is equal to c̄s1(v̂2).9
To summarize, Propositions 1 and 2 show that the optimal points mechanism is generally
more efficient than the corresponding static mechanism, as the points mechanism introduces
an additional consideration for the seller, which pushes both the price p1 and the marginal
buyer valuation v̂1 downwards, compared to a static mechanism. With the points mechanism,
the seller has less of an incentive to distort the allocation for type t1 at τ = 2 away from the
efficient one. Moreover, Proposition 2 also characterizes the buyer’s expected surplus, which is
analogous to that in a static mechanism. The additional surplus generated by the lower price
in the points mechanism is captured by the seller, through the participation fee q.
4.1.1 Discussion
The results in Section 4.1 lead to several interesting observations about the role of the points
program in the seller’s pricing strategy and its effect on consumers.
First, the adoption of a points program benefits both types of consumers (compared to the usual
static mechanism, discussed in more detail in section 4.2). The seller has a novel incentive at
τ = 2 to lower both types’ prices, in order to reduce the interim value of type t1’s outside option,
i.e. to make the points program less generous. This effect differs both from the seller’s incentives
in a static mechanism (where the outside option is 0), and from those in a dynamic mechanism
with commitment. In the latter setting, the seller would not generally want to decrease the
value of the points program, as it can commit to its terms and capture the associated surplus
ex ante. In contrast, with limited commitment the seller’s incentive at τ = 2 is unambiguously
to “devalue” the points program as much as possible, to capture larger intra-period rents. This
sequential optimality effect, which arises due to the lack of commitment of the seller, decreases
the ex ante value of the program for consumers.
Nonetheless, both types of consumers benefit from the adoption of the points program in expec-
tation, as long as the capacity constraint does not bind (assumption 2). The seller is only able
to capture type t1’s interim surplus relative to that type’s outside option, which is to mimic
type t2. Thus t1’s overall expected surplus from the game is equal to t2’s, and both benefit from
9Notice that a type t1 buyer may receive a negative payoff ex post, with some probability. For example, a
t1 buyer with valuation v1 = 0 gets an ex post payoff of −q, and more generally, a low value buyer who does
not buy at the posted price may similarly have a negative ex post payoff, if it does not receive a unit from the
points program. However in expectation buyer types receive weakly positive payoffs and their participation is
guaranteed ex interim at τ = 1.
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the seller’s incentive to reduce spot prices at τ = 2.
Second, propositions 1 and 2 imply that the seller’s profit is front-loaded: it captures less
revenue at τ = 2 and more at τ = 1. This reflects the fact that the seller screens consumers less
at τ = 2 and restricts its quantities sold to a lesser extent than in the standard monopolistic





[µ+ (1− µ)(1− F2(v̂2))− k].





The πt1 term is lower, since k > (1 − µ)(1 − F2(v̂2)) by assumption 2, and the corresponding
virtual surplus type is smaller with the points program.
Moreover, the term [µ + (1− µ)(1− F2(v̂2))− k] is exactly the measure of type t1 buyers who
do not obtain a unit of the good through either the posted price or the points program, since
k − (1− µ)(1− F2(v̂2)) is exactly the capacity that will be allocated to t1 buyers through one
of the two channels. Hence the seller’s interim profit is strictly decreasing in the capacity that
is allocated to type t1 consumers (through either channel), unlike in the usual monopolistic
pricing problem. Here, more capacity allocated to t1 types leads to strictly lower interim
revenue, because it requires more capacity to be allocated through the points lottery, and hence
requires larger surplus for t1 types to be induced to buy at the posted price. Nonetheless, the
seller captures additional revenue at τ = 1, as in equilibrium it benefits from the surplus that
consumers anticipate from τ = 2.
Similarly, the seller’s period 2 profit from type t2 is
πt2 = (1− µ)
[1− F2(v̂2)]2
F ′2(v̂2)




In the standard monopolistic pricing model, the corresponding revenue from type t2 would be




The πt2 term is lower, since the seller can reduce t1’s outside option by selling more units to type





Finally, propositions 1 and 2 show that the effect of the points program is different from that
of sequential screening. In the canonical sequential screening model, the seller benefits from
dynamic contracting because it allows it to screen consumers at two different stages and exploit
the differences in their value distributions. Sequential screening models generally assume that
different types have value distributions ordered according to first-order stochastic dominance,
as in Courty and Li (2000)’s two-type model (Proposition 2.2). These differences in the distri-
butions represent the difference between business and leisure travellers in the airline industry,
for example. Hence the effect of sequential screening vanishes if the types have identical value
distributions.
In contrast, in my model the effect of the points program exists even when these value dis-
tributions are exactly the same. Consider the special case where F1 = F2 = F , under the
interpretation that t1 types arrive at τ = 1 and t2 types arrive at τ = 2. In this case there is no
heterogeneity among consumers at τ = 1, except for the ability of the seller to interact with a
subset of types at τ = 1. From Proposition 1, the virtual surplus equation is the same for both
types, and yields
v̂ = [1− F (v̂)]F (v̂)
F ′(v̂) .
Hence the allocation of the good at the posted price is the same, but the seller charges t1 a
lower price than t2:
p1 = v̂[1−H(v̂, v̂)] < v̂ = p2,
in order to incentivize it to buy, rather than take the points lottery.
Therefore under this interpretation the points program helps the seller screen consumers based
on their arrival times, rather than based on differences in their value distributions. These dif-
ferences in arrival times can be interpreted as differences in the frequency with which buyers
participate in the market: the seller can interact with buyers ex ante and offer them a points
program if they purchase repeatedly, but cannot interact with them if they are one-off buyers.
Therefore the points program adds an additional tool to price discriminate (even in the ab-
sence of differences in value distributions), beyond the well-known monopolistic and sequential
screening tools.
4.2 The static and full commitment benchmarks
As a benchmark for comparison I now consider the optimal mechanisms in three different
settings: (i) a static model where τ = 2 is the only period, (ii) a static model with an ex ante
participation fee, and (iii) a dynamic model with full commitment where at τ = 1 the seller can
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commit to a mechanism for τ = 1, 2. These three settings are closely related to my analysis of
points mechanisms, but they reflect very different assumptions regarding what is contractible
or not from the perspective of τ = 1. The first static setting is least demanding in terms of the
degree of commitment that it requires on the part of the seller, as it only requires intra-period
commitment within τ = 2. A static setting with an ex ante participation fee, on the other
hand, would require that the seller can commit to completely exclude buyer types at τ = 2 if
they do not participate at τ = 1, which is not sequentially optimal. Moreover, this requires
that the seller be able to interact with all buyer types at τ = 1, whereas my main model can
be interpreted as one where the seller can interact with some subset of buyer types at τ = 1.
Finally, a dynamic model is the most demanding on the part of the seller, as it must be able to
commit to long-term contracts for all buyer types, where the period 2 prices and allocations are
generally not sequentially optimal. The latter is a strong assumption that may not be realistic
in many applications, such as in the airline examples of the allocation of award redemptions
and business upgrades.
I compare the optimal points mechanism with limited commitment to all three of these bench-
marks, in order to illustrate the main driving forces behind the different distortions that arise
in these settings. Throughout the remaining analysis I assume, analogously to Assumption 1,
that the relevant distributions of valuations in each benchmark are nicely behaved, i.e. satisfy
regularity conditions that yield unique solutions for the virtual valuation equations.
The optimal static mechanism
Remark 1. Consider the static model where FS(v) = µF1(v)+(1−µ)F2(v) denotes the aggregate
distribution of buyer valuations at τ = 2. The optimal static mechanism at τ = 2 is a posted









In the special case where F1 = F2 it is particularly easy to compare the points mechanism and
the static mechanism. In this case Proposition 1 and Remark 1 imply the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If F1 = F2, then FS = F2 and v̂S ≥ v̂1 = v̂2. Moreover, total surplus is larger in
the optimal points mechanism, the buyer’s expected surplus is larger, and the seller’s expected
profit is larger in the optimal points mechanism, π > πS.
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If F1 = F2, the interpretation of the main model is that type t1 arrives at τ = 1, or can be
contracted with at τ = 1, whereas type t2 either arrives later at τ = 2, or cannot be contracted
with at τ = 1. In this case the seller strictly benefits from the ability to offer a points mechanism,
as opposed to a static one. The prices and allocations in the optimal static mechanism generate
larger total surplus than in the optimal static one. The optimal q in Proposition 2 implies that
the buyer’s expected ex ante surplus is weakly larger than that from the static mechanism,
and the seller captures all of the residual surplus. In particular, the revenue from type t1 is
front-loaded in the points mechanism: the seller captures less revenue from t1 at τ = 2, but
total revenue from t1 is larger, as the fee q charged at τ = 1 more than offsets the lower interim
revenue at τ = 2.
The optimal static mechanism with a participation fee
One can also compare the points mechanism to a static one with a participation fee. The
latter setting requires a stronger degree of commitment, as it allows the seller to commit to
exclude buyer types in period τ = 2 if they do not pay a fee at τ = 1. In contrast, in the
points mechanism the seller cannot credibly exclude any types at τ = 2, and the prices and
allocations offered at τ = 2 have to be sequentially optimal. The optimal static mechanism
with a participation fee is one where the seller sets the same price as in Remark 1 and charges
a participation fee equal to the entire expected interim buyer surplus. The seller can extract
all of the surplus because it can now commit to exclude any type who does not participate.
Remark 2. The optimal static mechanism with a participation fee consists of posted prices at
τ = 2,
p =
v̂S if the buyer participates at τ = 1,1 if the buyer does not participate at τ = 1,









The optimal full commitment mechanism
In contrast to the previous two benchmarks, now consider a two-period setting with full com-
mitment. The seller can offer a dynamic mechanism at τ = 1, so it can commit ex ante to
19
transfers and allocations over both periods. This setting is the same as the two-type case of
Courty and Li (2000), and the optimal mechanism is characterized by their Proposition 2.2.
It is easy to see that the points mechanism is less efficient and yields lower expected revenue
than the optimal dynamic mechanism with full commitment. This is because transfers and
allocations in the points mechanism have to be sequentially optimal at τ = 2, when the buyer
already has more precise private information about her type. In contrast, in the dynamic
mechanism this sequential optimality consideration is absent, and the seller internalizes the
efficiency gains from the transfers and allocations it induces at τ = 2, because it can capture
those gains in expectation, at τ = 1.
To see that the total surplus and the seller’s expected profits are larger in the full commit-
ment mechanism than in the points mechanism, consider the following (suboptimal) dynamic
mechanism that the seller could commit to.
Remark 3. Consider a dynamic mechanism with posted prices p1 = 0, p2 = v̂2, for types t1, t2
respectively, and a participation fee of q = cs1(0) − c̄s1(v̂2). This mechanism yields larger
revenue and generates larger total surplus than the optimal points mechanism.
More generally, the optimal dynamic mechanism does weakly better than that in Remark 3, as
the seller would offer a different price p2 which reduces type t1’s information rents. Hence full
commitment would be more valuable to the seller than the ability to offer a points program. The
latter, however, requires a weaker and more realistic degree of commitment in many settings.
4.3 Points mechanisms without commitment
A natural question in this setting is how important is the precise type of commitment that the
seller can make in period 1 regarding its points program. As an alternative assumption, suppose
the seller cannot commit to allocate all unsold capacity through the points program, but instead
chooses how much of this unsold capacity to allocate, in a sequentially rational manner. What
equilibria can be sustained in this case, and what revenue can the seller capture?
To answer this question I first have to slightly generalize the timing of the events in the model.
In period 1 the seller offers a points program; buyers privately learn their type ti and decide
whether to participate in the points program. In period 2 buyers privately learn their valuations;
the seller posts a price for the good and the buyers simultaneously decide whether to buy a unit
or not. Finally, the seller decides what measure of its unsold capacity to allocate through the
points program. This timing of the model simply adds an additional stage at the end, where
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the seller chooses ex post how much of its unsold capacity to give away. As in the main model,
I focus on the equilibrium where types t1 participate in the points program while t2 do not.
I denote by r the measure of the good that the seller decides to give away ex post, where
r ∈ [0, k − d(p1, p2)]
and d(p1, p2) is the measure of the good sold at τ = 2, in the equilibrium where type t1
participates in the points program at τ = 1 and t2 does not participate.
The following proposition shows that this extension of the model has a continuum of equilibria
with different allocations and different buyer beliefs regarding the seller’s unsold capacity. The
set of equilibria spans the full range of mechanisms between the static mechanism in Remark 1
and the optimal points mechanism with limited commitment in Proposition 2. At one extreme,
there is an equilibrium where ex post the seller allocates no residual capacity through the
points program, i.e. r = 0; buyers anticipate this and make purchase decisions as if there is no
points program; this mimics the optimal static mechanism. At the other extreme, there is an
equilibrium where the seller allocates all of its residual capacity through the points program,
i.e. r = k − d(p1, p2); buyers anticipate this and make purchase decisions as if the seller has
commitment; this mimics the optimal points mechanism.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1, the extension of the model where the seller chooses r ex
post has a continuum of equilibria. For r ∈ [0, k−µ(1−F (v̂1))− (1−µ)(1−F (v̂2))] there exists
an equilbirium with price pr1 for type t1 given by:
pr1 ∈ [p1, p̄1]
where p1 = (1−F1(v̂1))F ′1(v̂1) [µ− k + (1− µ)(1− F2(v̂2))], p̄1 =
1−F1(v̄1)
F ′1(v̄1)








The revenue-maximal equilibrium, which is weakly Pareto dominant, coincides with the optimal




[µ−k+(1−µ)(1−F2(v̂2))] and r = k−µ(1−F1(v̂1)−(1−µ)(1−F2(v̂2)).
Intuitively, when the seller chooses how much of its unsold capacity to give away ex post, it is
indifferent among all feasible r because there is no renegotiation at that point. This generates a
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multiplicity of equilibria, depending on which r the seller chooses at the final stage of the game.
In each equilibrium the buyer correctly anticipates the seller’s choice of r. For any r a buyer of
type t1 must then play a cutoff strategy when deciding whether to buy a unit or not, with the
cutoff vr1(p1) depending on her belief about r and on the posted price p1. Given this, the seller
chooses p1 to maximize its revenue, anticipating that the buyer will decide according to the
cutoff strategy vr1(p1). Different equilibrium values of r determine different equilibrium prices
pr1, ranging between the price p1 = v̂1[1−H(v̂1, v̂2)] from Proposition 2, and the optimal static
price p̄1 = v̄1. Hence any outcome that is inbetween the outcomes of the points mechanism and
of the static mechanism can be an equilibrium outcome.
Moreover, one can rank all of these equilibria: the revenue-maximal equilibrium is the one
where pr1 = p1, and the seller allocates all unsold capacity through the points program, i.e. r
is as large as possible. This is because in all equilibria of the game the buyer has the same
expected surplus, while the seller captures all of the incremental surplus that is generated by
any capacity allocated through the points program. Thus the revenue-maximal equilibrium is
the one that generates the largest total surplus, subject to prices being sequentially optimal at
τ = 2. Hence the seller is better off in the equilibrium where pr1 is as low as possible, given that
it is in the set [p1, p̄1], and r is as large as possible, given pr1.
4.4 Points mechanisms with uniform pricing
In my main model the seller faces a continuum of small buyers who have private information
in both periods. In period 2 the seller faces 2 subsets of buyers with valuations drawn from
two different distributions, so the seller benefits from price discrimination at τ = 2. In this
section, I instead consider a model with a continuum of infinitesimal representative buyers,
whose private valuations are drawn from the same distribution, and characterize the optimal
points mechanism with uniform pricing at τ = 2, i.e. when the seller does not price discriminate
in the spot market. As before, I study the equilibrium where type t1 participates in the points
program, while type t2 does not. In what follows I present assumptions and results that closely
mirror those in section 4.1.
Consider a seller with capacity k < 1 who faces a continuum of buyers with measure 1, each
buyer with a unit demand for the good. As in the main model, the seller and buyers interact
over 2 periods, τ ∈ {1, 2}. At τ = 1 all buyers have type t = t1 with probability µ, or
t = t2 with probability 1 − µ. Each type ti in period 1 corresponds to a distribution over the
buyers’ valuations realized in period 2: type t1 has v drawn from some distribution F1, while
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type t2 has v drawn from some distribution F2.10 As in the main model the distribution of
values is uncertain at τ = 1, representing the heterogeneity of buyers in the spot market. The
only difference here is that values are drawn from a single distribution at τ = 2, so there is a
continuum of representative buyers.
Lemma 2. Let
H(v̄1) ≡
k − [1− F1(v̄1)]
F1(v̄1)
denote a type t1 buyer’s endogenous probability of receiving a unit from the points program, when
the marginal t1 buyer type at τ = 2 is v̄1.
Then the seller’s expected profit from τ = 2 can be written as:
max
v̄1
v̄1[1−H(v̄1)][1− F1(v̄1)]µ + v̄2[1− F2(v̄2)](1− µ)
The function H(v̄1) is the analog of H(v̄1, v̄2) defined previously, and captures type t1’s endoge-
nous outside option, which in this case is independent of the prices and allocations offered to
type t2.
To guarantee the existence and uniqueness of an optimal mechanism, I impose the following
modified regularity condition on the distributions of values, F1 and F2.
Assumption 3. Assume that there exist unique v̂1, v̂2 with v̂1 ≤ v̂2 such that the value distri-








This joint regularity condition is analogous to Assumption 1, the only difference being that
type t2’s virtual surplus is now independent of t1’s virtual surplus, since the two types do not
interact in period 2. Hence t2’s virtual surplus is exactly the same as in a static model.
I also impose an analogous condition on the capacity k, which ensures that the seller’s problem
is non-trivial (i.e. does not collapse to the usual static screening problem).
Assumption 4. Assume k ≥ 1− F1(v̂1).
I can now characterize the optimal points mechanism with uniform pricing at τ = 2.
10Equivalently, there is a state of the world t ∈ {t1, t2}, with corresponding probabilities µ and 1− µ, and in
state t1 the valuations are drawn from F1, while in state t2 they are drawn from F2.
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Proposition 4. Under Assumptions 3 and 4, the optimal points mechanism at τ = 2 allocates









Type-t1 buyers with v1 < v̂1 participate in the points lottery, while type t2-buyers with v2 < v̂2
are excluded from the mechanism. The optimal prices which implement this allocation are
p1 = v̂1[1−H(v̂1)],
p2 = v̂2.
The main intuition behind this result is exactly the same as in Proposition 1—the seller’s trade-
off includes the usual monopolistic screening incentives, plus the additional consideration that
by lowering t1’s price, it can reduce t1’s endogenous outside option and information rents, and
hence extract more surplus on the margin. The difference in this case is that with uniform
pricing at τ = 2, this effect applies only to t1, since the two types do not interact at τ = 2.
Next, I give the analog of Proposition 2. Let cs1(v̂1) denote type t1’s expected interim surplus
at τ = 2 if it participates in the points program at τ = 1, and let c̄s1(v̂1) denote t1’s expected












Proposition 5. The seller’s optimal price for participation in the points program at τ = 1 is
q = cs1(v̂1)− c̄s1(v̂1)
and the expected total revenue from the optimal mechanism is
π = µ [1− F1(v̂1)]
2(1− k)
F ′1(v̂1)




Proposition 5 shows that the main results also hold with uniform pricing at τ = 2. The seller
benefits from the ability to offer a points program, which generates lower prices and larger
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surplus at τ = 2, some of which is captured by the seller through the participation fee q charged
at τ = 1. The only difference relative to Proposition 2 is that the interim profits from types t1
and t2 are now independent, since the seller does not price discriminate in period 2.
5 Conclusion
This paper studies a novel aspect of points programs, such as frequent flyer and other reward
programs: points programs offer firms an additional channel to implement dynamic pricing,
and can be profitable even in the absence of competition. While the economics literature has
generally focused on the role of points programs in creating customer loyalty and switching
costs, I show that points programs are also a valuable sequential screening tool. In particular, a
firm can use its points program as a way to indirectly allocate its capacity dynamically, before
consumers have private information regarding their valuation for the good. This mechanism
works even in the absence of commitment, i.e. even if the seller cannot fully commit as to what
kind of mechanism or contract it will subsequently offer in the spot market for the good.
I study a setting where a firm can offer consumers the ability to participate in a points program
ex ante, and can commit to allocate any residual unsold capacity through this program. I
characterize the optimal points mechanism, where the firm sells points ex ante, it then offers a
contract to sell the good to consumers who have private information about their valuations, and
finally any unsold capacity is allocated among members of the points program. The introduction
of the points program creates an endogenous and type-dependent outside option for consumers
at the interim stage, in the spot market for the good. This changes the firm’s pricing incentives,
in a way that induces less screening at that stage, and hence a more efficient allocation.
The model yields new insights regarding the management and design of reward programs: I
show that the optimal mechanism reverses the standard intuition of demand cannibalization. In
general one might expect that if the firm offers consumers two different channels to obtain the
good, the introduction of the points program may cannibalize some of the demand in the spot
market for the good. This is only partially true—for any given contract, demand in the spot
market is indeed lower when the firm offers a points program, since some consumers optimally
choose to not purchase, and instead obtain the good through the points mechanism. However,
the optimal equilibrium contract changes when the firm offers a points program. In fact, I show
that the firm will set lower prices in the game where it also offers a points mechanism. Hence
overall we see the opposite of demand cannibalization: by offering a points program, the firm
induces more efficient pricing in the spot market, and ultimately screens less and sells more of
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its capacity. The above is also relevant to the application of antitrust and consumer protection
regulation: if loyalty programs work solely as a switching cost mechanism, they can lower total
surplus and reduce welfare. In contrast, my paper shows that if such programs are used to
allocate unsold capacity, they can in fact increase total surplus and welfare.
The predictions of this model are consistent with several important observations from industries
that feature loyalty and points programs. First, firms tend to use their loyalty programs as a
way to allocate unsold capacity, or “distressed inventory.” This is often noted by industry
commentators who observe that airlines, for example, tend to release much of their unsold seats
to members of their frequent flyer programs, who can book these seats by redeeming frequent
flyer miles. Second, in addition to using pricing algorithms to implement revenue management,
in practice airlines also use algorithms to decide how much capacity to release to members of
their loyalty programs, and at what time to do so. The design of such algorithms is clearly an
important economic problem, because the firm faces a trade-off between its pricing mechanism
and its points program. Third, firms generally face a commitment problem in terms of the
operation of their loyalty program: when deciding what prices to set, the firm would myopically
prefer to make this program less generous, although in the long run this would undermine the
value of the program and the premium that consumers would be willing to pay to participate in
it. This paper shows that while loyalty programs can still be valuable in a setting with limited
commitment, they would indeed be even more valuable if the firm could commit to the terms of
its loyalty program. My results also provide some surprising implications for firm strategy: it
is tempting to think of loyalty programs as a mechanism that induces demand cannibalization,
but this is in fact a primary reason why they are profitable overall, and firms which use such
programs in fact benefit from increasing participation and redemptions through their loyalty
program. Furthermore, the results and intuition apply more broadly to industries that share
the main features of my model, where consumers have heterogeneous willingness to pay that is
revealed over time, the firm has a fixed capacity to sell, and the firm can interact with consumers
ex ante, or repeatedly over time, through its loyalty program.
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Proof. At any posted price pi for type ti, if a buyer with value vi buys a unit at price pi, then
any type v′i > vi is also willing to buy a unit; if a buyer with value vi does not buy a unit at price
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pi, any type v′i < vi is also not willing to buy a unit. Hence there exists a cutoff type, denoted
v̄i, who is exactly indifferent between buying at the posted price pi or taking the outside option.
The residual capacity of the seller is then
k − µ[1− F1(v̄1)]− (1− µ)[1− F2(v̂2)].
The measure of type t1 buyers who participate in the points program and do not buy a unit
at price p1 is µF1(v̄1). Hence a type t1 buyer’s probability of receiving a unit from the points
program, as a function of the marginal buyer valuations, is:
H(v̄1, v̄2) ≡
k − µ[1− F1(v̄1)]− (1− µ)[1− F2(v̂2)]
µF1(v̄1)
.
Next, consider the buyers’ equilibrium purchase decisions. For type t2 buyers with an outside
option of 0, we have
v̄2 = p2.
For type t1 buyers, the marginal valuation must satisfy the indifference condition:
v̄1 − p1 = v̄1H(v̄1, v̄2).
Hence v̄1 · [1−H(v̄1, v̄2)] = p1.
The seller’s expected profit from period 2 can now be written as follows:
v̄1[1−H(v̄1, v̄2)][1− F1(v̄1)]µ + v̄2[1− F2(v̄2)](1− µ).
Proposition 1
Proof. By Lemma 1 the seller’s maximization at τ = 2 is
max
v̄1,v̄2
v̄1[1−H(v̄1, v̄2)][1− F1(v̄1)]µ + v̄2[1− F2(v̄2)](1− µ).
The FOCs for v̄1 and v̄2 give the following two conditions:
[1−H(v̄1, v̄2)][1− F1(v̄1)]− F ′1(v̄1)v̄1[1−H(v̄1, v̄2)]−
∂H(v̄1, v̄2)
∂v1
v̄1[1− F1(v̄1)] = 0
−∂H(v̄1, v̄2)
∂v2
v̄1[1− F1(v̄1)]µ+ [1− F2(v̄2)](1− µ)− v̄2F ′2(v̄2)(1− µ) = 0
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To simplify these, note the following:
1−H(v̄1, v̄2) =

























By Assumption 3, there exist unique v̂1 and v̂2 that solve these equations. In particular, t1
types with values v1 ≥ v̂1 buy a unit and those with values v1 < v̂1 participate in the points
program; t2 types with values v2 ≥ v̂2 buy a unit and those with values v2 < v̂2 are excluded
from the mechanism.
The optimal prices that correspond to this allocation are:
p1 = v̂1[1−H(v̂1, v̂2)],
p2 = v̂2.
Proposition 2
Proof. At τ = 1 a type t1 buyer has the option to pay the fee q and participate in the points
program, or not. In the former case, the buyer’s expected surplus from the sequentially optimal
prices at τ = 2, given by Proposition 1, is equal to cs1(v̂1). If instead the buyer does not
participate, type t1’s expected interim surplus in this case is c̄s1(v̂2), corresponding to the
subgame where at τ = 2 it faces the sequentially optimal price p2 = v̂2. The optimal fee q is
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such that type t1 is exactly indifferent between these two continuation games, hence











Therefore the seller’s total expected revenue from τ = 1, 2 is
π = [1− F1(v̂1)]
2
F ′1(v̂1)
[µ+ (1− µ)(1− F2(v̂2))− k]+










Proof. I proceed by backward induction. Consider the seller’s choice of r ex post. Suppose the
seller posts prices p1, p2 and a measure d(p1, p2) of buyers purchase the good. The seller thus
chooses r ∈ [0, k − d(p1, p2)] ex post. Note that the seller is indifferent among all feasible r at
this stage. Therefore consider any equilibrium with some feasible r ∈ [0, k− d(p1, p2)]. When a
buyer decides whether to buy a unit or not, in equilibrium she accurately anticipates r.
For any given equilibrium r, a type t1 buyer expects some surplus csr1 from period 2, taking
as sunk the cost of participating in the points program at τ = 1. When the seller sets some
qr at τ = 1, t1 buyers choose between paying qr and obtaining an expected surplus of csr1 in
period 2, or not paying qr and obtaining a surplus of c̄s1(v̂2), as in Proposition 2. The optimal
price of a point, qr, at τ = 1 is thus qr = csr1 − c̄s1(v̂2) for a given equilibrium r. Hence in any
equilibrium the consumer’s expected surplus from τ = 2 is c̄s1(v̂2), while the seller captures
all of the incremental surplus generated by the points program. Thus in the revenue-maximal
equilibrium, p1 and r must maximize total surplus in period 2, subject to the constraint that
the price offered is sequentially optimal.
Following the proof of Proposition 1, the sequentially optimal price for type t1 for any r at

















Notice that total surplus is maximized, subject to the constraint that pr1 be sequentially optimal,
when pr1 is as small as possible, i.e. equal to p1 in Proposition 1, and when r = k−µ(1−F1(v̂1))−
(1− µ)(1− F2(v̂2)).




[µ−k+(1−µ)(1−F2(v̂2))] and r = k−µ(1−F1(v̂1)−(1−µ)(1−F2(v̂2)).
Lemma 2
Proof. At any posted price pi for type ti, if a buyer with value vi buys a unit at price pi, then
any type v′i > vi is also willing to buy a unit; if a buyer with value vi does not buy a unit at price
pi, any type v′i < vi is also not willing to buy a unit. Hence there exists a cutoff type, denoted
v̄i, who is exactly indifferent between buying at the posted price pi or taking the outside option.
In the history where the buyer participates at τ = 1, the seller believes t = t1 and sets a posted
price p1, which induces some corresponding cutoff valuation v̄1. The residual capacity of the
seller is then k − [1 − F1(v̄1)]. The measure of type t1 buyers who participate in the points
program and do not buy a unit at price p1 is F1(v̄1). Hence a type t1 buyer’s probability of
receiving a unit from the points program, as a function of the marginal buyer valuation, is:
H(v̄1) ≡
k − [1− F1(v̄1)]
F1(v̄1)
.
Next, consider the buyers’ equilibrium purchase decisions. For type t2 buyers with an outside
option of 0, we have
v̄2 = p2.
For type t1 buyers, the marginal valuation must satisfy the indifference condition:
v̄1 − p1 = v̄1H(v̄1).
Hence v̄1 · [1−H(v̄1)] = p1.
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The seller’s expected profit from period 2 can now be written as follows:
v̄1[1−H(v̄1)][1− F1(v̄1)]µ + v̄2[1− F2(v̄2)](1− µ).
Proposition 4
Proof. By Lemma 2 the seller’s maximization at τ = 2 is
max
v̄1,v̄2
v̄1[1−H(v̄1)][1− F1(v̄1)]µ + v̄2[1− F2(v̄2)](1− µ).
The FOCs for v̄1 and v̄2 give the following two conditions:
[1−H(v̄1)][1− F1(v̄1)]− F ′1(v̄1)v̄1[1−H(v̄1)]−H ′(v̄1)v̄1[1− F1(v̄1)] = 0
1− F2(v̄2)− F ′2(v̄2)v̄2 = 0















By Assumption 3, there exist unique v̂1 and v̂2 that solve these equations. In particular, t1
types with values v1 ≥ v̂1 buy a unit and those with values v1 < v̂1 participate in the points
program; t2 types with values v2 ≥ v̂2 buy a unit and those with values v2 < v̂2 are excluded
from the mechanism.
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The optimal prices that correspond to this allocation are:
p1 = v̂1[1−H(v̂1)] =
[1− F1(v̂1)](1− k)
F ′1(v̂1)




Proof. At τ = 1 a type t1 buyer has the option to pay some fee q and participate in the points
program, or not. In the former case, the buyer’s expected surplus from the sequentially optimal
mechanism at τ = 2, given by Proposition 4, is equal to cs1(v̂1). If instead the buyer does not
participate, type t1’s expected interim surplus in this case is c̄s1(v̂1). The optimal fee q is such
that type t1 is exactly indifferent between these two continuation games, hence











Therefore the seller’s total expected revenue from τ = 1, 2 is
π = µ [1− F1(v̂1)]
2(1− k)
F ′1(v̂1)
+ (1− µ) [1− F2(v̂2)]
2
F ′2(v̂2)
+ cs1(v̂1)− c̄s1(v̂1)
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